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Abstract
We consider a setting where an auctioneer sells a single item to n potential agents with
interdependent values. That is, each agent has her own private signal, and the valuation of each
agent is a known function of all n private signals. This captures settings such as valuations for
artwork, oil drilling rights, broadcast rights, and many more.
In the interdependent value setting, all previous work has assumed a so-called single-crossing
condition. Single-crossing means that the impact of agent i’s private signal, si, on her own
valuation is greater than the impact of si on the valuation of any other agent. It is known that
without the single-crossing condition an efficient outcome cannot be obtained. We study welfare
maximization for interdependent valuations through the lens of approximation.
We show that, in general, without the single-crossing condition, one cannot hope to ap-
proximate the optimal social welfare any better than the approximation given by assigning the
item to a random bidder. Consequently, we introduce a relaxed version of single-crossing, c-
single-crossing, parameterized by c ≥ 1, which means that the impact of si on the valuation
of agent i is at least 1/c times the impact of si on the valuation of any other agent (c = 1 is
single-crossing). Using this parameterized notion, we obtain a host of positive results.
We propose a prior-free deterministic mechanism that gives an (n−1)c-approximation guar-
antee to welfare. We then show that a random version of the proposed mechanism gives a
prior-free universally truthful 2c-approximation to the optimal welfare for any concave c-single
crossing setting (and a 2
√
nc3/2-approximation in the absence of concavity). We extend this
mechanism to a universally truthful mechanism that gives O(c2)-approximation to the optimal
revenue.
1 Introduction
The most fundamental problem in the theory of auctions is how to sell a single item to n potential
buyers efficiently; i.e., how to allocate the item to the agent who values it the most. This problem
has been fully resolved in 1961 in the case where agents have independent private values (IPV).
Indeed, [Vickrey, 1961] introduced the second-price auction, which is dominant-strategy incentive
compatible and fully efficient.
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While much research has concentrated on the independent private values model, for many
high-stake auctions that arise in practice (e.g., auctions for mineral rights [Wilson, 1969]), agents’
valuations are correlated, a special case of which are common values, where agent values are identical
[Milgrom, 1979; Wilson, 1969]. In such cases the independent private values model is unsuitable.
To address scenarios of this type, Milgrom and Weber [1982] introduced the model of interde-
pendent values. In their model, every agent i has a non-negative private signal si, and the valuation
of agent i is a function of the entire signal vector; i.e., vi = vi(~s). While the signal is private and
unknown by other agents or the auctioneer, the valuation functions are commonly known by all1.
Consider the following scenario, which is a variant of the scenario given in [Dasgupta and
Maskin, 2000].
Example 1. Two firms compete for the right to drill for oil on a given tract of land. Firm 1
has a marginal drilling cost of 1, while firm 2 has a marginal drilling cost of 2. Suppose oil is
sold in the market at a price of 4. Firm 1 performs a private test and discovers that the expected
size of the oil reserve is s1 units. This scenario gives rise to the following valuation functions:
v1(s1, s2) = (4− 1)s1 = 3s1, and v2(s1, s2) = (4− 2)s1 = 2s1.
Other examples include: (a) common value auctions, where the value of the item for sale
is identical amongst bidders, but bidders may have different information about the item’s value
[Wilson, 1969], and (b) auctions with resale, where vi(~s) =
∑n
j=1 βijsj , where βij ≥ 0 for all
1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Here, an agent’s value depends on her personal valuation for the item and its resale
value, which is reflected by the valuations of others [Klemperer, 1998; Myerson, 1981].
In scenarios with interdependent values, a direct revelation mechanism is one where every agent
i reports his signal si to the mechanism, and the mechanism, knowing the (expected) valuation of
each agent as a function of the signal vector, determines the allocation and the payments. The
strongest notion of truthfulness relevant in the interdependent value setting is that truth telling
is an ex-post Nash equilibrium. Truth-telling is said to be ex-post Nash if, for every bidder i, for
every possible realization of the other bidders’ signals ~s−i, and given that other bidders report their
signals truthfully, then it is in bidder i’s best interest to report her true signal. Truthfulness in
dominant strategies is not viable in interdependent values since the value of one agent depends on
the signals of others2.
Work on interdependent values has typically assumed a prior joint distribution (either corre-
lated or independent) on the signals. One can further categorize this body of work under various
informational assumptions (is the distribution of signals commonly known by agents? is it known
by the auctioneer?), and solution concepts (Bayes-Nash, ex-post Nash, etc.).
To quote Bergemann and Morris [2005], “The mechanism design literature assumes too much
common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner.” Such common knowledge
may be unrealistic, and moreover, can lead to miraculous outcomes. For example, Cre´mer and
1A variation on this assumption is the asymmetric knowledge scenario, where the valuation functions are common
knowledge amongst the agents but not known to the auctioneer. This variant was studied in [Dasgupta and Maskin,
2000; Perry and Reny, 1999].
2To see why a dominant strategy truthful mechanism is hopeless, note that if some agent (Alice) misreports her
signal, even if every other agent reports truthfully, the valuation of other agents depends on the signal given by Alice,
so valuations computed using the corrupt signal from Alice (corrupt valuations) may vary from the true valuations
(based on the non-corrupted signals). Thus, the allocation and prices can be quite different than those computed
from the non-corrupted signals, and it may not be a best response of the agents to reveal their true signals. In fact,
it is easy to give examples where truth-telling is clearly not a reasonable response.
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McLean [1985, 1988] show how to extract full surplus as revenue under appropriate assumptions
and solution concepts (in particular, commonly known correlated distributions and Bayes Nash
equilibrium). This approach follows the seminal work of Wilson [1985] that posits Wilson’s doc-
trine3: simple detail-free mechanisms should be preferred in order to alleviate the risks introduced
by various assumptions.
In this work we follow this doctrine and propose prior-free mechanisms—mechanisms that do
not require any knowledge of the underlying distribution. Moreover, our mechanisms are universally
ex-post truthful. Ex-post truthfulness means that bidders maximize utility for any signal profile,
so any underlying distribution of bidder values is irrelevant. For universally truthful mechanisms,
even if the bidders know in advance the random internal coin tosses made by the mechanism they
still have no incentive to bid non-truthfully.
Single-crossing. All previous work on interdependent values assumes some version of a single-
crossing (SC) condition on the valuations [Milgrom and Weber, 1982; d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-
Varet, 1982; Maskin, 1992; Ausubel et al., 1999; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000; Bergemann, Shi, and
Va¨lima¨ki, 2009; Chawla, Fu, and Karlin, 2014; Che, Kim, and Kojima, 2015; Li, 2016; Roughgarden
and Talgam-Cohen, 2016]. Several definitions of single-crossing have been suggested in the liter-
ature. We define the single-crossing (SC) condition as done in Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen
[2016]4: for every agent i, for any set of other players’ signals ~s−i, and for every agent j,
∂vi(si, ~s−i)
∂si
≥ ∂vj(si, ~s−i)
∂si
.
Thus, as a function of signal i (si), the valuation of bidder i (vi), increases at least as much as the
valuation of any other bidder (vj , j 6= i).
Under the SC condition, a generalization of the VCG mechanism maximizes social welfare
[Maskin, 1992; Ausubel et al., 1999; Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016; Chawla et al., 2014];
this generalized VCG mechanism is deterministic, ex-post truthful and prior-free. It can be easily
verified that the valuations in the oil drilling example described in Example 1 satisfy the SC
condition. Indeed, v1 (as a function of s1) grows faster than v2 (as a function of s1).
However, there are many scenarios where the SC condition does not hold. Consider for example
the following scenario of two firms competing for oil drilling rights, given in [Dasgupta and Maskin,
2000].
Example 2. As before, each firm has a marginal cost for drilling, but this time each firm also
has a fixed cost for drilling. Firm 1 has a fixed cost of 1 and a marginal cost of 2, while firm 2
has a fixed cost of 2 and a marginal cost of 1. Suppose oil is sold in the market at a price of 4.
Firm 1 performs a private test and discovers that the expected size of the oil reserve is s1 units.
This scenario gives rise the following valuation functions: v1(s1, s2) = (4− 2)s1 − 1 = 2s1 − 1, and
v2(s1, s2) = (4− 1)s1− 2 = 3s1− 2. These valuations do not satisfy the SC condition. The increase
in firm 2’s valuation increases faster than firm 1’s valuation as a function of s1.
As another example, consider the following scenario regarding two retail chains, each interested
in renting some location for a shop.
3Due to Robert Wilson (1985), and not referring to the Harold Wilson wiretapping doctrine (1966), nor to the
Woodrow Wilson extension of the Monroe doctrine (1912).
4Appendix A briefly discusses other definitions of single-crossing, and how the results of our paper can be adapted
appropriately.
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Example 3. Each of the two retail chains has conducted a survey to estimate the income level of
the population in the area. Let si be the estimate obtained by retail chain i (furthermore, assume
that 1 ≤ si ≤ 2). A good estimate for the income level in the area is the average of s1 and s2.
The valuations of the two retail chains for opening a shop at this location are functions of the
income level in the area, since the demand for the goods is a function of the customer income
level. Suppose that the first retail chain sells normal goods, whereas the second retail chain sells
luxury goods. Let the corresponding valuations be v1(s1, s2) = 0.06+
s1+s2
2 (for normal goods) and
v2(s1, s2) = (
s1+s2
2 )
1.1 (for luxury goods). These valuations do not satisfy the SC condition: as a
function of s1, the rate of increase for v2 is faster than the rate of increase for v1. (See Figure 1).
Figure 1: Valuations v1 (retail chain 1, normal goods) and v2 (retail chain 2, luxury goods) for
opening a shop as a function of the income level. Income level is itself well-estimated as the average
of the two signals, s1 and s2.
It is well known that, without the single-crossing assumption, it is generally impossible to
achieve full efficiency [Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000; Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001]. Thus, the next
step is to seek near-optimal guarantees. This is our approach; namely, we study settings with
interdependent valuations through the lens of approximately-optimal efficiency.
Unfortunately, without single-crossing, it is not generally possible to give any non-trivial ap-
proximation guarantee to the social welfare (see Section 2.5). Thus, the obvious next question is
to study the tradeoff between assumptions and the quality of the approximation. The two ends of
this spectrum are (a) the single-crossing assumption and full efficiency, and (b) no assumptions on
the valuation functions and no efficiency guarantees.
To study this tradeoff, we introduce the following parameterized version of the single-crossing
condition: A valuation profile is said to be c-single-crossing if for every agent i, for any set of other
players’ signals ~s−i, and for every agent j,
c · ∂vi(si, ~s−i)
∂si
≥ ∂vj(si, ~s−i)
∂si
.
This means that as buyer i’s signal changes, the change in any other agent’s value is at most c times
the change in agent i’s value. For example, the valuations described in Example 2 violate the SC
condition, but they are 1.5-SC. Similarly, the valuations described in Example 3 are 1.18-SC. Can
these scenarios, which deviate only slightly from SC, permit good approximation guarantees? We
answer this question in the affirmative. In particular, we provide welfare guarantees that depend
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on the parameter c. Our approximation guarantees are strong in the sense that they hold for any
signal profile ~s. (This is in contrast to approximation guarantees that are given in expectation over
the signal profile).
Moreover, we are also interested in revenue guarantees under relaxed SC valuations. In [Chawla
et al., 2014] it was shown that for SC and concave valuations, revenue maximization follows from
welfare maximization. Here, concavity essentially means that buyers are more sensitive to a change
in some agent’s signal when all of the buyers have lower signals. Like Chawla et al. [2014], we show
that, for settings with c-single-crossing and concave valuations, [approximate] revenue maximization
follows from [approximate] welfare maximization.
1.1 Our Results
Before presenting our results, we present our approximation notion.
Our approximation notion We say that the value of bidder j is α-approximated by bidder i’s
value at profile ~s, which we denote by vi(~s)
α≈ vj(~s), if vj(~s) ≤ αvi(~s). We say that an allocation
gives a prior-free α-approximation to welfare if, for every signal profile ~s, the value of the bidder
with the highest value is α-approximated by the bidder being allocated to in ~s by the mechanism.
A prior-free mechanism gives an α-approximation to the welfare without any assumption on prior
distributions. The quality of the approximation, for our randomized mechanisms, is in expectation
over the internal coin tosses of the mechanism and nothing else5.
Our results In Section 2.5, we show that without SC, no deterministic prior-free mechanism can
achieve any guarantee for welfare. Moreover, as we show in Section 3, there exists a distribution on
signals such that no (randomized) mechanism can do better than allocating the item to a random
agent. Such a mechanism would result in no better than 1/n fraction of the optimal welfare.
We then study welfare approximation in settings where buyer valuations satisfy c-SC. We also
consider the impact of the number of possible signals per buyer, i.e., the size of the set of potential
signals that a buyer may have. Some of our results depend on this parameter.
In Section 4, we identify two settings that admit a deterministic prior-free c-approximation:
(a) 2 bidders, any signal space (Theorem 1), and (b) any number of bidders, each with a signal
space of size 2 (Theorem 2). This approximation is tight in several senses. First, it is provably
impossible to obtain better than a c-approximation in these settings. In fact, in the case of signal
spaces of size 2, this impossibility holds even if one considers randomized, truthful-in-expectation
mechanisms with a known prior distribution on the buyer signals. We also show that these are the
most general settings that admit a c-approximation. In particular, for 3 bidders, one with signal
space of size 3 and two with signal spaces of size 2—no c-approximation on the social welfare is
possible (Proposition 3).
We also give results for general settings with n bidders, each of which has one one of k possible
signals. We start by constructing a family of deterministic prior-free mechanisms that obtain a
c(n − 1)-approximation (Theorem 3). The mechanism imposes some (arbitrary) ordering pi over
the bidders. In every iteration, the next bidder in pi is added, and a “tentative allocation” is
5The alternative to prior-free approximation is that the approximation only holds in expectation over some prior
distribution; i.e., α
∑
~s∈×iSi f(~s)
∑
i xi(~s)vi(~s) ≥
∑
~s∈×iSi f(~s) maxi vi(~s), where ~s comes from a joint distribution F
with density f(·).
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Setting
Deterministic
Upper Bound
Prior-free
Randomized
Upper Bound
Prior-free
Deterministic
Lower Bound
Prior-free
Randomized
Lower Bound
(even w/ Prior)
Without Single
Crossing
— n (§1) ∞ (‡1) n (]1)
c-single-crossing
arbitrary n, k
(n− 1)c (†2) O
(
min(c3/2 · √n, n)
)
(§2) c+ Ω(1) (‡2) c (]2)
c-single-crossing
arbitrary n, k
Concavity
(n− 1)c (†3) min(2c, n) (§3) c (‡3)
c-single-crossing
2 bidders (n = 2)
c (†4) min(c, 2) (§4) c (‡4)
c-single-crossing
2 Signals (k = 2)
c (†5) min(c, n) (§5) c (‡5) c (]5)
(§1−−§5) Choosing a bidder at random gives an n
approximation.
(‡1) Section 2.5.
(]1) Section 3.
(†2) Via the Hypergraph-Coloring algorithm of Sec-
tion 5.
(§2) The c3/2 · √n approximation — Section C.1.
(‡2) Subsection 4.4.
(]2) For sufficiently large n, implied by cell (]5), lower
bound example with 2 signals.
(†3) Implied by cell (†2).
(§3) The 2c approximation — Section 6. If we only
have d-concavity, for some d ≥ 1, then 2c becomes
c(d+ 1).
(‡3) Lower bound in Figure 5 has concave valuations
(with 2 bidders and 2 signals).
(†4) See Section 4.1.
(§4) A deterministic c approximation is implied by
cell (†4).
(‡4) Lower bound in Figure 5 (with 2 bidders and 2
signals).
(†5) Using the algorithm of Figure 4, Section 4.1.
(§5) A deterministic c approximation is implied by
cell (†5).
(‡5) Implied by cell (]5), for sufficiently large n.
(]5) For sufficiently large n, see Subsection 4.3.
Table 1: Our Results for Social Welfare maximization. The randomized upper bounds are also
universally truthful.
determined. This includes making appropriate changes to the previous tentative allocation so as
to preserve approximation guarantees and monotonicity (truthfulness) with respect to the newly
added bidder.
The algorithm is described as computing the full allocation table for all possible signal profiles,
which would take non-polynomial time. However, we show that computing the allocation for any
profile of signals, on the fly, can be done in polytime (O(n2k log k) time—Theorem 4).
We then show that a randomized version of this mechanism has much better welfare guarantees.
In particular, if the valuations are concave, then the randomized mechanism obtained by imposing
a random ordering over the agents gives a prior-free, universally truthful mechanism that gives a
2c-approximation (Theorem 6). (This guarantee extends to c(d + 1) for d-concave valuations—a
parameterized version of concavity). For general c-SC valuations, this mechanism gives a 2c3/2
√
n-
approximation (Theorem 5).
While the main focus of this paper is social welfare guarantees, our results have implications
to revenue optimization. For concave valuations, we establish a black-box reduction from (approx-
imate) welfare to (approximate) revenue, for every implementable allocation rule. To establish
this reduction, we use similar ideas to ones used in [Chawla et al., 2014]. In particular, every
c-single-crossing setting with n bidders and concave valuations admits a randomized, universally
truthful mechanism that gives an O(c2)-approximation (and O(c2d2)-approximation for d-concave
6
valuations) (Theorem 8).
We refer the reader to Table 1, where we give an in depth description of the implications of our
results for social welfare. The table shows how the various results relate to one another and gives
references to where each upper and lower bound stems from in the organization of this paper.
2 Model and Preliminaries
We consider an auction setting where a single item is sold to n agents with interdependent values
(Milgrom and Weber [1982]). Each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} receives a single signal si which is known
only to agent i. Let ~s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) be a signal profile, let ~s−i denote all signals but si, and let
(s′i, ~s−i) denote the profile ~s but where si has been replaced with s
′
i. The set of potential signals for
bidder 1 ≤ i ≤ n is a discrete signal space Si. Without loss of generality, assume Si = {0, 1, . . . , ki};
for ease of exposition we may assume that ki = k for all i.
Each agent i also has a publicly known valuation function vi : ×iSi → R≥0, which maps every
signal profile of the n agents to a real (non-negative) value. The valuation functions for all bidders
i are monotone non-decreasing in every signal sj for all j.
The input to a mechanism is a vector of reported signals ~b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn). Mechanisms are
described by a pair (x, p), where x is a set of allocation functions x = {x1(~b), . . . , xn(~b)} satisfying∑
i xi(~s) ≤ 1 for all possible ~b, and p a set of payment functions p = {p1(~b), . . . , pn(~b)}. An
allocation function xi : ×jSj → [0, 1] maps every bid profile ~b to the probability that agent i gets
allocated. A payment rule pi : ×jSj → R maps the reported bids ~b to the expected payment from
bidder i. A bidder’s expected utility is quasilinear, given by xi(~b) · vi(~s)− pi(~b) where ~s is the true
signal profile of the agents.
2.1 Solution Concepts
We focus on the design of incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanisms. In the
interdependent setting, we cannot hope for truth-telling to be a dominant strategy: one agent’s
misreport could cause the auctioneer to overcharge a different agent. The strongest incentive-
compatibility (IC) concept in this setting is thus that truth-telling is an ex-post Nash Equilibrium,
or that it is in every agent i’s best interest to report his true signal si given that all other agents
reported the true signal profile ~s−i:
xi(~s) · vi(~s)− pi(~s) ≥ xi(bi, ~s−i) · vi(~s)− pi(bi, ~s−i) ∀~s ∈ ×jSj , bi ∈ Si. [IC]
Similarly, individual rationality (IR) cannot possibly hold if signals are corrupted, so the appropriate
notion with respect to individual rationality is that of ex-post IR, i.e.,
xi(~s) · vi(~s)− pi(~s) ≥ 0 ∀~s ∈ ×jSj , bi ∈ Si. [IR]
Thus, in this paper, incentive-compatibility (IC) refers to truth-telling being an ex-post Nash
and individual rationality (IR) refers to ex-post individually rational. We use the term truthful
mechanism for mechanisms that are both; all the mechanisms we present are truthful.
We emphasize that the information state is the following: (a) agents know their own valuation
function vi, and their own private signal si; (b) the auctioneer knows the valuation functions of
the agents participating; and (c) signals are private and arbitrary. Except for bidder i, no other
bidder, nor the auctioneer, knows anything about si.
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An allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) is said to be implementable if there exist payment functions
p = p1, . . . , pn such that the mechanism (x, p) is truthful.
We give both deterministic and randomized truthful mechanisms. Our randomized mechanisms
are a distribution over a family of deterministic mechanisms, all of which are truthful (i.e., they
are universally truthful [Nisan and Ronen, 1999; Dobzinski and Dughmi, 2009]).
All the mechanisms we present are prior-free; i.e., there is no assumption of an underlying prior
over the agents’ signals; neither in the design of the mechanism, nor in the truthfulness notion, nor
in the approximation guarantees. Every assertion holds for every signal profile ~s.
We note that weaker solution concepts appear in the literature; i.e., truthful-in-expectation (vs.
universally truthful), Bayesian truthful (vs. ex-post truthful), and interim IR (vs. ex-post IR).
The reader is referred to [Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016] for formal definitions. All of our
positive results hold for our solution concept, which is analogous to dominant-strategy IC in the
private value setting. Many of our impossibility results hold even with respect to weaker solution
concepts.
2.2 Monotone Allocations
The following definition is key in characterizing which mechanisms are truthful.
Definition 1 (Monotonicity). An allocation function xi is said to be monotone if for every ~b−i,
xi(~b−i, bi) is monotone non-decreasing in the signal bi.
Similar to Myerson’s characterization for the independent private value setting, Roughgarden
and Talgam-Cohen [2016] characterized the class of truthful mechanisms, as follows.
Proposition 1. Monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for allocation functions x to
be implementable, i.e., there exist payment functions p such that the mechanism (x, p) is truthful.
Moreover, an analogue of Myerson’s payment identity holds, so the payment is uniquely determined
by the allocation function.
It follows that constructing a truthful mechanism is equivalent to constructing a monotone
allocation function.
An allocation function xi is called deterministic if xi(~b) ∈ {0, 1} for all i and all ~b. For a
deterministic mechanism, we use the notation
x(~s) = i when xj(~s) =
{
1 if j = i
0 otherwise.
Given a deterministic monotone allocation function xi and signals for agents 6= i, ~s−i, the crit-
ical signal for i is as follows: if there exists some bi such that xi(s−i, bi) = 1 then set b∗i =
minbi xi(s−i, bi) = 1, otherwise there is no critical signal for i.
For deterministic truthful mechanisms, the payment identity of Roughgarden and Talgam-
Cohen [2016] implies the following.
Proposition 2. Let agent i be the allocated winner at bid profile ~s in a deterministic truthful
mechanism. Then his payment is his value at the critical bid, i.e., pi = vi(~s−i, b∗i ).
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2.3 Single-Crossing
A single-crossing condition captures the idea that bidder i’s signal has a greater effect on bidder
i’s value than on any other bidder’s value. Formally:
Definition 2 (Single-Crossing). A valuation profile is said to satisfy the single-crossing condition
if for every agent i, for any set of other players’ signals ~s−i, and for every agent j,
∂vi(si, ~s−i)
∂si
≥ ∂vj(si, ~s−i)
∂si
.
In the context of discrete signal spaces, for si = 1, . . . , ki, define
∂vj(si,~s−i)
∂si
= vj(si, ~s−i)−vj(si−
1, ~s−i).
Whenever single-crossing holds, full efficiency can be achieved: once an agent has the highest
value, by the single-crossing condition, his value continues to be the highest of all bidders as
his signal increases. Therefore, allocating to the bidder with the highest value defines a monotone
allocation rule, and therefore, according to Proposition 1, it is implementable. The payment of that
agent is then just his value at his critical signal. Note also that this mechanism is deterministic
and prior-free. This is precisely the generalized VCG mechanism used in [Maskin, 1992].
Unfortunately, according to Proposition 1, monotonicity of the allocation rule is also neces-
sary. Hence, without single-crossing, it is impossible to have a truthful mechanism that maximizes
welfare.
2.4 Approximation
While full efficiency is unattainable without single-crossing, one might hope for approximate ef-
ficiency. We say that the value of bidder j is α-approximated by bidder i’s value at profile ~s,
which we denote by vi(~s)
α≈ vj(~s), if vj(~s) ≤ αvi(~s). We say that an allocation x gives a prior-free
α-approximation to welfare if
α
∑
i
xi(~s)vi(~s) ≥ max
i
vi(~s) ∀~s ∈ ×iSi.
A prior-free mechanism gives an α-approximation to the welfare without any assumption on
prior distributions. The quality of the approximation (welfare, revenue), for our randomized mech-
anisms, is in expectation over the internal coin tosses of the mechanism and nothing else6.
The generalized VCG mechanism (that gives optimal efficiency under single-crossing) is a prior-
free mechanism.
2.5 Impossibility Results for Settings Without Single-Crossing
Here we show that no truthful, prior-free, and deterministic mechanism can obtain any bounded
approximation ratio when the valuations do not satisfy single-crossing.
Example: [Impossibility for deterministic prior-free mechanisms] Consider a scenario with two
6The alternative to prior-free approximation is that the approximation only holds in expectation over some prior
distribution; i.e., α
∑
~s∈×iSi f(~s)
∑
i xi(~s)vi(~s) ≥
∑
~s∈×iSi f(~s) maxi vi(~s), where ~s comes from a joint distribution F
with density f(·).
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bidders (bidder 1 and bidder 2), where S1 = {0, 1} and S2 = {0}, and the following valuation
functions:
v1(s1 = 0, s2 = 0) = r; v1(s1 = 1, s2 = 0) = r;
v2(s1 = 0, s2 = 0) = 1; v2(s1 = 1, s2 = 0) = r
2.
It is easy to see that v1 does not satisfy single-crossing since when s1 increases, v1 does not
increase but v2 increases by r
2 − 1, making v1 go from being r times greater than v2 to being r
times smaller than it.
We claim that, for these valuations, no truthful, deterministic, and prior-free mechanism has
an approximation ratio better than r. To see this, consider the signal profile (s1 = 0, s2 = 0).
To get a better than r-approximation for this profile, bidder 1 must win the item. Truthfulness
requires the allocation to be monotone in each bidder’s signal, hence bidder 1 must also win at
report (s1 = 1, s2 = 0), which results in an allocation that is a factor of r off from the optimal
allocation. Since r is arbitrary, the approximation ratio is arbitrarily bad.
In Section 3 we show that without single-crossing, even when we consider randomized mech-
anisms, no truthful randomized mechanism can achieve a better approximation than the simple
mechanism that allocates the item to a random bidder, disregarding the reported signals alto-
gether. This impossibility holds even if signals come from a known joint distribution.
2.6 Approximate Single-Crossing and Its Implications
The impossibility results motivate the following relaxed notion of single-crossing.
Definition 3 (c-Single-Crossing). A valuation profile is said to satisfy the c-single-crossing condi-
tion if for every agent i, for any set of other players’ signals ~s−i, and for every agent j,
c · ∂vi(si, ~s−i)
∂si
≥ ∂vj(si, ~s−i)
∂si
.
We now explore some useful properties of c-single-crossing, depicted in Figure 2.
Lemma 1. For any profile ~s and α ≥ c, if vi(~s) α≈ vj(~s) and the valuations satisfy c-single-crossing,
then for any ~s′ = (s′i, ~s−i) such that s
′
i > si, vi(
~s′)
α≈ vj(~s′).
Proof. By assumption, αvi(~s) ≥ vj(~s). By c-single-crossing, c
(
vi(~s
′)− vi(~s)
)
≥ vj(~s′) − vj(~s). In
addition, α ≥ c, so αvi(~s′) ≥ αvi(~s) + c
(
vi(~s
′)− vi(~s)
)
. Then adding the first two inequalities and
using this fact gives the desired result: αvi(~s
′) ≥ vj(~s′).
Corollary 1. For valuations that satisfy c-single-crossing, the following are implied by Lemma 1:
• The contrapositive: For any α ≥ c, if vi(~s) 6α≈ vj(~s), then at any profile ~s′ = (s′i, ~s−i) for
s′i < si, vi(~s
′) 6α≈ vj(~s′). See Figure 2.
• For any α ≥ c, if vi(~s) ≥ vj(~s), then at any profile ~s′ = (s′i, ~s−i) for s′i > si, vi(~s′)
α≈ vj(~s′).
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Figure 2: Left: An illustration of Lemma 1. Right: An illustration of
the contrapositive, mentioned in Corollary 1.
Figure 3: An illustration
of a propagation conflict.
Remark. We have defined our notion of c single-crossing as a relaxation of the single-crossing
definition in [Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016]. If a set of valuation functions obey the
[Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016] definition then they also obey the various other definitions
of single-crossing used in [Milgrom and Weber, 1982; d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet, 1982; Maskin,
1992; Ausubel et al., 1999; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000; Bergemann et al., 2009; Chawla et al.,
2014; Che et al., 2015; Li, 2016], but not vice versa. A discussion regarding alternative definitions
of single-crossing and the applicability of our results under these definitions appears in Appendix
A.
2.7 Concave valuations
Definition 4 (Concave Valuations). Valuations are said to be concave if for all bidders i, j and for
any ~s−j and ~s′−j such that (~s−j)` ≤ (~s′−j)` for all ` 6= j, it holds that
∂
∂sj
vi(~s−j , sj) ≥ ∂
∂sj
vi(
~s′−j , sj).
That is, when anyone aside from j’s signals are lower, then every bidder i is more sensitive to
the change in j’s signal as when those bidders (aside from j) have higher signals.
Remark[d-concave valuations]: We also consider a parameterized version of concavity. Valuations
are said to be d-concave if the inequality above is replaced by
d · ∂
∂sj
vi(~s−j , sj) ≥ ∂
∂sj
vi(
~s′−j , sj).
That is, every bidder is at least 1/d more sensitive to a change in j’s signal when bidders’ signals
are lower.
2.8 Monotonicity and propagation
We prove that several mechanisms are truthful and prior-free approximations to social welfare. In
each proof, we have two components: monotonicity and approximation. To demonstrate that the
approximation is prior-free, the approximation component is established for every profile ~s. To
demonstrate monotonicity in randomized mechanisms, we need to prove that monotonicity holds
for any allocation that might be realized after the random choices of the mechanism.
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In the construction of monotone allocations, we use the term an allocation propagation. Suppose
we assign x(~s) = i. Then, to ensure monotonicity of i’s allocation as his signal increases, we
propagate the allocation to i to all profiles s′i > si. That is, the propagation operation is the
assignment of x(s′i, ~s−i) = i for all s
′
i > si whenever x(~s) = i.
A propagation conflict, as depicted in Figure 3, refers to the event where we allocate in a way
such that multiple propagations cause multiple conflicting winners at some signal profile. Let s′i > si
and s′j > sj . If we assign x(si, s
′
j , ~s−ij) = i, this must propagate such that x(s
′
i, s
′
j , ~s−ij) = i. If
we also assign x(s′i, sj , ~s−ij) = j, this allocation must propagate such that x(s
′
i, s
′
j , ~s−ij) = j. Then
at (s′i, s
′
j , ~s−ij), we have a propagation conflict because both i and j must be the winner to satisfy
monotonicity, which is not possible.
Having propagation in our algorithm ensures that the allocation is monotone, so instead of
verifying monotonicity of the allocation, we only need to verify that no propagation conflicts occur.
3 Impossibility result for randomized mechanisms without single-
crossing
Consider the case where every bidder i’s signal space is Si = {0, 1}, and each agent i has a valuation
vi(~s) =
∏
j 6=i sj ; that is, the bidder has a value 1 if and only if every other agent has signal 1. For
every bidder i, for some small ε > 0,
si =
{
1 w.p. ε
0 w.p. 1− ε.
The optimal expected welfare is 1 whenever at least n − 1 bidders have a 1 signal. This happens
with probability εn + n · εn−1(1− ε). Therefore,
Opt = εn + n · εn−1(1− ε) > nεn−1(1− ε). (1)
Consider any truthful mechanism at profile (si = 0, ~s−i = ~1). At this profile, the mechanism
gets bidder i’s value in welfare with probability that he is allocated, xi(si = 0, ~s−i = ~1), and
otherwise gets zero since no other bidder has non-zero value. By monotonicity, for every i, we have
that xi(si = 0, ~s−i = ~1) ≤ xi(~1), and by feasibility,
∑
i xi(
~1) ≤ 1. Under any other profile (where
at least two signals are 0), all agents have zero value, so welfare is zero. The expected welfare of
any truthful mechanism is thus bounded by
Welfare =
∑
i
Pr[si = 0, ~s−i = ~1] · xi(si = 0, ~s−i = ~1) · 1 + Pr[~s = ~1]
∑
i
xi(~1) · 1
=
∑
i
εn−1(1− ε) · xi(si = 0, ~s−i = ~1) + εn
∑
i
xi(~1)
≤ εn−1(1− ε)
∑
i
xi(~1) + ε
n
∑
i
xi(~1)
≤ εn−1(1− ε) + εn
= εn−1. (2)
Combining (1) with (2), we get that the approximation ratio of any monotone mechanism is
Welfare/Opt ≤ 1n(1−ε) which can be made arbitrarily close to 1/n; this is the same as the welfare
attained by just allocating to a random bidder.
These last examples motivate the following notion of approximate single-crossing.
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4 c-Approximations for Settings with 2 Bidders or 2 Signals
In this section we give deterministic truthful mechanisms for two special cases.
4.1 A c-Approximation Mechanism for 2 Agents
A very simple idea gives a c-approximation for two bidders, independent of the sizes of their signal
spaces. Start at the signal profile that is the origin (0, 0) and allocate to the bidder who has the
largest value at this signal profile, say bidder 1. Propagate the allocation as 1’s signal increases.
Then move to the profile (s1 = 0, s2 = 1) and repeat this: allocate to the bidder who has the
highest value here, propagate as that bidder’s signal increases, and then move to the profile where
the losing bidder’s signal has increased by one. This algorithm is illustrated in Figure 4.
Two-bidder coloring:
• Let s1 = 0 and s2 = 0.
• While s1 ≤ |S1| or s2 ≤ |S2|:
– Let i ∈ argmaxivi(s1, s2) and let j 6= i.
– For all s′i ≥ si, set x(s′i, sj) = i.
– Let sj = sj + 1.
Figure 4: An illustration of the two-bidder coloring algorithm. (a) At (0, 0), bidder 1 has the
highest value. Allocate to 1 and propagate this to all profiles (s1, 0) for s1 > 0. (b) Move to (0, 1),
where bidder 2 has the highest value. Allocate to 2 and propagate this allocation to all profiles
(0, s2) where s2 > 1. (c) Move to (1, 1) where 1 is highest. Allocate to 1 and propagate.
Theorem 1. When we have two bidders whose valuations satisfy c-single-crossing, the allocation
function x given from the two-bidder coloring defines a truthful, deterministic, prior-free mechanism
that guarantees a c-approximation to social welfare.
Proof. (Monotonicity.) By construction, whenever we set x(s1, s2) = 1, we set x(s
′
1, s2) = 1 for
every s′1 > s1. Similarly, if x(s1, s2) = 2, then x(s1, s′2) = 2 for every s′2 > s2.
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(Approximation.) Suppose for any profile (s1, s2) that, without loss of generality, the item is
allocated to bidder 1. The algorithm sets x(s1, s2) = 1 either because v1(s1, s2) ≥ v2(s1, s2), in
which case, the highest valued bidder is the winner, or because it was true that v1(s
′
1, s2) ≥ v2(s′1, s2)
for some s′1 < s1. By Lemma 1, then cv1(s1, s2) ≥ v2(s1, s2). (A symmetric argument proves the
approximation for x(s1, s2) = 2.)
As we will show by the example in Figure 5, the bound of c is tight. Observe that these
valuations are also concave.
4.2 A c-Approximation to Welfare for Settings with 2 Signals
In this section, we consider the case where the size of the signal space for each bidder is at most
2: a bidder’s signal is either low (si = 0) or high (si = 1). We will denote by H(~s) the set of
high-signal-bidders at ~s, that is, H(~s) = {i | si = 1}.
For monotonicity in an allocation, if we allocate to bidder i at ~s, then for all ~s′ = (~s−i, s′i)
where s′i > si, we must propagate the allocation, allocating to bidder i at these profiles as well.
The 2-signal case is special because (1) an allocation can only propagate to at most one profile,
from si = 0 to si = 1, and (2) if si = 1 and we allocate to i, then no propagation is necessary, so
bidders with high signals are in a sense special. We can capitalize on these properties to achieve a
c-approximation, independent of the number of bidders n.
The mechanism is simple: consider profiles ~s in order of the number of high signals (equivalently,
in increasing hamming distance ||~s||0 from the origin). For any profile ~s in which the allocation has
not already been determined, if the high-signal bidder with the largest value iH c-approximates the
bidder with the largest value i∗, then allocate to iH . Otherwise, allocate to i∗ and propagate.
High-if-possible:
• For all profiles ~s increasing in ||~s||0, if x(~s) is undefined:
– Let iH ∈ argmaxi∈H(~s)vi(~s) and i∗ ∈ argmaxivi(~s).
– If viH (~s)
c≈ vi∗(~s), set x(~s) = iH .
– Otherwise, set x(~s) = i∗ and propagate to x(si∗ = 1, ~s−i∗).
Theorem 2. When we have n bidders where the size of the signal space is at most 2 and the valua-
tions satisfy c-single-crossing, the allocation x from high-if-possible gives a monotone, deterministic,
and prior-free c-approximation to social welfare.
Proof. (Approximation.) At every profile ~s, the allocated bidder c-approximates the highest valued
bidder. If the allocation at ~s is to bidder i and is determined by propagation, by the allocation
rule, it must be that at ~s′ = (si = 0, ~s−i) that i was the highest valued bidder, hence vi(~s′) ≥ vj(~s′)
for all bidders j. By Lemma 1, since only si increases from ~s
′ to ~s, then c · vi(~s) ≥ vj(~s), and thus
the maximum value is c-approximated by i’s value. Otherwise, by definition of the allocation rule,
we allocate to a bidder who c-approximates the maximum valued bidder at ~s.
(Monotonicity.) Our propagation step ensures monotonicity; we just need to verify that we
do not cause any propagation conflicts. The argument as to why not follows, and is illustrated
in in Figure 6. Suppose that at ~s we allocate to i with si = 0 and propagate i’s allocation to
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Figure 5: An example with 2 bidders
and 2 signals for each, where no deter-
ministic mechanism can improve upon
a c approximation.
Figure 6: An argument for why the algorithm results
in no conflicts via the common ancestor of any two
nodes that might conflict.
(si = 1, ~s−i). To have a propagation conflict at (si = 1, ~s−i) due to propagation of both i and some
other winner j, we observe that a propagation of j can only come from allocation at a profile where
sj = 0 to a cell where sj = 1: there could only be a conflict at (~s−i, si = 1) if sj = 1. By definition
of the allocation rule, we know that vj(~s) 6 c≈ vi(~s), or we would have allocated to j at ~s. Hence,
by Corollary 1, vj(sj = 0, ~s−j) 6 c≈ vi(sj = 0, ~s−j), and thus vi(sj = 0, ~s−j) > vj(sj = 0, ~s−j). By
Lemma 1, this implies that vi(si = 1, sj = 0, ~s−ij)
c≈ vj(si = 1, sj = 0, ~s−ij). Hence, there exists a
high-signal bidder whose value c-approximates j’s value, so the algorithm would never allocate to
j at this profile. Thus, there are no propagation conflicts.
We next show that the c-approximation is tight. In the example depicted in Figure 5, the val-
uations satisfy c-single-crossing, and any allocation x that achieves better than a c-approximation
must allocate to bidder 1 at profile (0, 1) and to bidder 2 at profile (1, 0). However, for mono-
tonicity, we need to propagate these allocations, which would cause a propagation conflict at (1, 1);
hence no monotone allocation that achieves better than a c-approximation is possible. In fact, in
Subsection 4.3, we show that the c is tight even if we consider random and truthful-in-expectation
mechanisms that are given the prior distribution over signals.
Further, the approximations for this 2-signal case and the 2-bidder case of Section 4.1 are tight
in another sense, as proven in Subsection 4.4.
4.3 Randomized c lower bound with c-single-crossing
In Section 4.2, we presented a deterministic, prior-free, and universally truthful mechanism guar-
anteeing a c-approximation for the case where each bidder has two signals. In this section, we show
this is essentially tight, even if one considers randomized, truthful in expectation mechanism that
are given the prior. This essentially shows that the algorithm in Section 4.2 is optimal for that
case.
Consider the case where there are n bidders, and for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, agent i’s value is defined
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as follows:
vi =

0 si = 0 and ∃j 6= i : sj = 0
1
c si = 1 and ∃j 6= i : sj = 0
1 si = 0 and ∀j 6= i : sj = 1
1 + 1c si = 1 and ∀j 6= i : sj = 1
It is easy to see the valuations are c-single-crossing since whenever i’s signal increases from 0 to
1, his value increases by 1/c, while every other bidder’s value increases by at most 1. Consider
the following (known) correlated distribution over signal profile. The probability that ~s = ~1 is an
arbitrarily small , and the probability for any vector profile where si = 0 for exactly one coordinate
i and sj = 1 for every other coordinate is (1− )/n. It is immediate that
Opt = (1− ) + (1 + 1/c) > 1.
Consider any truthful mechanism at profile (si = 0, ~s−i = ~1). At this profile, the mechanism
gets bidder i’s value in welfare with probability that he is allocated, xi(si = 0, ~s−i = ~1), and
otherwise gets 1/c. By monotonicity, for every i, we have that xi(si = 0, ~s−i = ~1) ≤ xi(~1), and by
feasibility,
∑
i xi(
~1) ≤ 1. We have that
Welfare ≤
∑
i
Pr[si = 0, ~s−i = ~1] ·
(
xi(si = 0, ~s−i = ~1) · 1 + (1− xi(si = 0, ~s−i = ~1))/c
)
+ Pr[~s = ~1]
∑
i
xi(~1) · (1 + 1/c)
≤
∑
i
(1− )/n · (xi(si = 0, ~s−i = ~1) + 1/c) + (1 + 1/c)
≤ (1− )/n
∑
i
xi(~1) + (1− )/c+ + /c
≤ 1/n+ 1/c+ .
Therefore, Welfare/Opt ≤ 1/n+ 1/c+ , which as n tends to∞ and as  is arbitrarily small,
tends to 1/c, hence we get a lower bound that tends to c as n tends to ∞.
4.4 No c-approximation exists for more than 2 agents with more than 2 signals
The minimal scenario that does not fall into the regime where we have already established a tight
c-approximation is one with three bidders, two with signal space of size 2, and one with signal space
of size 3. That is, S1 = {0, 1, 2} and S2 = S3 = {0, 1}. We show that this scenario generally does
not admit a c-approximation.
Proposition 3. Let n be the number of bidders, and ki the size of bidder i’s signal space. For any
setting with n ≥ 3, ki ≥ 3 for some i, and c-single-crossing valuations, there exists an instance
where no truthful deterministic prior-free allocation can achieve a c-approximation to welfare.
Proof. Figure 7 depicts a valuation structure where the signal space is S1 × S2 × S3 = {0, 1, 2} ×
{0, 1} × {0, 1}. We show that in order to have a c-approximation to the welfare, a number of
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constraints on the allocation must be satisfied, which, when taken together, yield a contradiction.
Numerical values that support this structure are depicted in Appendix B.
Consider the structure depicted in Figure 7. At valuation profile ~sa = (s1 = 2, s2 = 0, s3 = 0), no
other bidder has a value that c-approximates bidder 2’s value, therefore, we must allocate to bidder 2
at this profile. By propagation, we must allocate to bidder 2 at profile ~sb = (s1 = 2, s2 = 1, s3 = 0)
as well. Now consider profile ~sc = (s1 = 1, s2 = 1, s3 = 0). At this valuation profile, bidder 2’s
value does not c-approximate the value of the maximum bidder. Therefore, we must allocate either
to bidder 1 or bidder 3 at ~sc. We show that both options lead to a contradiction, proving the claim.
• If we allocate to bidder 1 at ~sc, then by propagation, we must allocate to bidder 1 at ~sb as
well, but we already claimed that in order to get c-approximation to welfare, we must allocate
to bidder 2 at ~sb.
• If we allocate to bidder 3 at ~sc, by propagation, we must allocate to bidder 3 at ~sd = (s1 =
1, s2 = 1, s3 = 1). Now, inspecting ~se = (s1 = 0, s2 = 1, s3 = 1), we notice that no bidder’s
value c-approximates bidder 1’s value at this profile. Allocating to bidder 1 at ~se implies that
we must allocate to bidder 1 at ~sd, which creates a propagation conflict with bidder 3 at ~sd.
A visualization of the implications of this structure and the conflict that must arise due to it is
depicted in Figure 8.
Figure 7: Left: The constraints on approximation of the values in the slice where s3 = 0. Right:
The constraints where s3 = 1. The labeling “not i” indicates that i does not c-approximates the
highest value. The labeling “must be i” indicates that no other bidder c-approximates i’s value.
5 A Deterministic Mechanism for Welfare in the General Setting
In the previous section, we have seen how in two special cases, we can achieve a truthful, determinis-
tic, prior-free c-approximation to welfare, which is also tight. However, we have also seen that there
is no hope for achieving a truthful, deterministic, prior-free c-approximation in any setting that is
more general than these. In this section, we explore what welfare guarantee we can achieve in the
general setting of n bidders with any numbers of signals when using deterministic and prior-free
mechanisms.
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Figure 8: The implications of the valuations on the allocation rule in order to have a c-
approximation, which leads to a propagation conflict at profile ~sd = (1, 1, 1) where both 1 and
3 have been propagated as the winners.
5.1 Potential Propagation Conflicts
The structure that arises in the 3-bidder example and makes a c-approximation impossible (Subsec-
tion 4.4) seems inevitable for any α-approximation when α < c2. What is to stop us from requiring
that, in order to achieve an α-approximation, we must not allocate to bidder 3 at profile (0, 2, 0) but
also we must allocate to bidder 3 at profile (1, 2, 0)? This will force us to propagate the allocation
for all s′3 > 0, but leave a gap at (0, 2, s′3) where we can never allocate to bidder 1 without causing
a conflict! As shown in Figure 9 below, it is the case that this structure could arise.
To prevent this scenario, we want to avoid allocating to bidder 3 at (1, 2, 0). That is, we want the
allocation to bidder 3 to have the property that whenever we allocate to 3, we have also allocated
to 3 at every profile where s1 and/or s2 are smaller. If this is the case, then we never have this
propagation in the middle of the s1×s2 plane. If we only aim for a c2-approximation, this is indeed
possible. If bidder 3 is the highest valued bidder at some profile ~s, and neither bidders 1 nor 2
c-approximate his value, then by Corollary 1, the structure propagates in both dimensions toward
the axes, as desired. Otherwise, one of bidder 1 and 2 does c-approximate 3, say bidder 1. It turns
out that we may need to allocate to bidder 2 to maintain monotonicity; however, we know that
a monotone c-approximation to bidders 1 and 2 is possible by Theorem 1, and thus, if we must
allocate to bidder 2, then bidder 2 c-approximates bidder 1, so bidder 2 is a c2-approximation to
bidder 3. For n bidders, the same ideas work to give cn−1.
What saves us from a seemingly inevitable cn−1 factor is a subtle observation of where c-single-
crossing continues to be helpful. This observation, described in the “key lemma” in the next section,
shows that in an allocation like that of Figure 9, it’s actually impossible to ever need to allocate to
1 at the profiles where allocating to 1 would cause a propagation conflict. Thus, these propagations
in the middle are actually okay, and we can design a mechanism that handles them carefully.
5.2 The Key Lemma and Its Implications
We observe a surprising implication of c-single-crossing: as we increase the signal profile in an
additional dimension, we lose not a multiplicative c, but only an additive c. See Figure 10.
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Figure 9: Structures to arise due to monotonicity where
certain bidders (here, bidder 1) may never be allocated to.
If the valuations ever require allocating to 1 at any profile
(0, 2, s3) in order to obtain an α-approximation, it would be
impossible to do so.
Figure 10: Illustration of the
key lemma: v2(~s)
α≈ v3(~s),
and as 1’s signal increases, then
max{v1, v2} α+c≈ v3.
Lemma 2 (Key Lemma). Let ~s = (s1, . . . , sn) be a signals profile. For any three agents i, j, `,
if vi(~s)
α≈ vj(~s) for some α ≥ c, then at ~s′ = (~s−`, s′`) where s′` ≥ s` and ` 6= j, we have that
max{vi(~s′), v`(~s′)} is an (α+ c)-approximation to vj(~s′).
In English, if vi α-approximates vj , then at a profile where only s` has changed and has increased,
max{vi, v`} (α + c)-approximates vj , so at no such profile are we required to allocate to j for an
(α+ c)-approximation.
Proof. By assumption, α · vi(~s) > vj(~s). By c-single-crossing, because ~s′ is obtained from ~s by
increasing only s`, then c
(
v`(
~s′)− v`(~s)
)
≥ vj(~s′)− vj(~s). We get that
(α+ c) max{vi(~s′), v`(~s′)} ≥ αvi(~s) + cv`(~s′) monotonicity of vi
≥ αvi(~s) + c
(
v`(
~s′)− v`(~s)
)
non-negativity of v`
≥ vj(~s) + vj(~s′)− vj(~s) adding above equations
= vj(
~s′).
5.3 An (n− 1)c-approximation for n bidders
Let pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , pin) be an ordering over the n agents, and let k be the size of the signal space.
The following is the high level idea behind the algorithm that gives the allocation—we later
define what it means for a value to be “sufficiently well-approximated”. For clarity of exposition,
we rename bidders so that pii becomes i.
We begin by tentatively allocating to bidder 1 at all profiles where 1 reports any signal s1 and
all other bidders report 0. Now, for bidders j = 2, . . . , n (called iteration j):
1. We correct previously determined allocations (all of which had sj = 0) to ensure that j’s value
is sufficiently well-approximated (where vj is not well-approximated if her value is greater than
some yet-to-be-determined factor of max(v1, . . . , vj−1)).
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2. Then, we iteratively consider signal profiles as sj increases from 1 to k, copying the allocation
from profiles where j’s signal was sj − 1. However, we switch the allocation to bidder j if
the previous allocation (for the profile with smaller sj) does not approximate bidders 1, . . . , j
sufficiently well.
Figure 11 may be helpful in illustrating these ideas.
We remark that the this algorithm, Hypergrid-Coloring(pi), as described, computes the allocation
for every possible profile of signals. As the number of such profiles is (k + 1)n, it trivially follows
that the time complexity is Ω(kn). In section 5.4 we show how to determine the correct allocation,
given an arbitrary signal profile, in polytime.
Definition 5. Given a profile of signals ~s, a permutation pi, and some index 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we define
the ith intermediate profile, ~sipi as follows:
( ~sipi)j =
{
sj if j = pi` for some 1 ≤ ` ≤ i
0 otherwise
.
For example, take n = 5, pi = (5, 2, 3, 1, 4), s = (s1, s2, . . . , s5), then
~s3pi = (0, s2, s3, 0, s5).
In the description of the algorithm and the rest of this section we assume that pi is the identity
permutation (i.e., pii = i—simply rename the bidders). We use~0[j:`] to denote 0 values in coordinates
j, j+ 1, . . . , ` of the vector. For example, (s1, s2, . . . , si−1,~0[i:n]) denotes a signal profile with signals
s1 through si−1 in positions 1 through i− 1 and zeros elsewhere.
Note that if pi is the identity permutation we have that
~sipi = (s1, s2, . . . , si,~0[i+1:n]).
We define the set of all possible signal profiles for signals for bidders ` ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1}:
S<j = {(s˜1, . . . , s˜j−1) | s˜` ∈ {0, . . . , k}, ` ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1}} .
Hypergrid-Coloring(pi):
• For all s1 ∈ {0, . . . , k}, at all profiles (s1,~0[2:n]), tentatively allocate to bidder 1: set x(s1,~0[2:n]) =
1.
• For j = 2, 3, . . . , n:
– For all sj ∈ {0, . . . , k} and for all ~s<j ∈ S<j :
∗ If sj > 0 (i.e. the allocation at ~s is yet undefined), tentatively allocate to the same
bidder as at (~s<j , sj − 1,~0[j+1:n]): set
x(~s<j , sj ,~0[j+1:n]) = x(~s<j , sj − 1,~0[j+1:n]).
∗ If the winning bidder at ~s does not (j−1)c-approximate the maximum value among
the first j agents at ~s or does not c-approximate j’s value, reallocate to j: set
x(~s<j , sj ,~0[j+1:n]) = j.
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Figure 11: The algorithm run on pi = (1, 2): Start by allocating to 1. Increase s2 from 0 to k,
copying the allocation from the previous layer of s2 each time and correcting to reallocate to 2
when 1 is not a sufficient approximation. The right-most figure depicts the final allocation.
Theorem 3. For n bidders with valuations that satisfy c-single-crossing, the Hypergrid-Coloring
algorithm is a truthful, deterministic, and prior-free (n− 1)c-approximation to social welfare.
Proof. (Approximation.) We show inductively that after iteration j, every profile (~s<j+1,~0[j+1:n]),
for ~s<j+1 ∈ S<j+1, is allocated to a bidder whose value (j − 1)c-approximates the highest of the
first j bidders.
As a base case, after iteration 2, every profile ~s = (s1, s2,~0[3:n]), (s1, s2) ∈ S<3, is either allocated
to bidder 1 because v1(~s)
c≈ v2(~s), or the item was reallocated to bidder 2 because v1(~s)
c
6≈ v2(~s)
and thus bidder 2’s value is highest, so the item is allocated to a bidder who c-approximates the
highest value of the first 2 bidders.
Suppose the claim holds for iterations 1 through j − 1. In iteration j, first we correct every
profile (~s<j , 0,~0[j+1:n]), ~s<j ∈ S<j , by reallocating to j if his value is not c-approximated by the
previous winner, ensuring that the allocation at every such profile is now a (j − 2)c-approximation
to the first j bidders.
As we increase sj , if the algorithm reallocates from bidder i to j at (~s<j , sj ,~0[j+1:n]), we know
by definition of the algorithm that at profile (~s<j , 0,~0[j+1:n]), the algorithm allocated to bidder i,
and thus i’s value was a (j − 2)c-approximation to the first j − 1 bidders. At this profile, only
j’s signal has increased, so by the key lemma (Lemma 2), the larger of i and j’s values must be
a (j − 1)c-approximation to the highest value of the first j bidders. If i’s value is not a (j − 1)c-
approximation to all of the first j bidders, then j’s value must be, so reallocating to bidder j
maintains the (j − 1)c-approximation.
If i’s value was a (j − 1)c-approximation but we reallocated to j, this must be because i’s
value wasn’t a c-approximation to j’s value, so of course j’s value is larger. Thus the (j − 1)c-
approximation is maintained by reallocating to j. The only other possibility is that the algorithm
did not reallocate to j, and thus i passed the check that he (j − 1)c-approximates the highest of
the first j bidders.
Thus, the claim holds, so after all n iterations, at each profile, the item is allocated to a bidder
who (n− 1)c-approximates the highest of all n bidders.
(Monotonicity.) We also show monotonicity by induction. The first iteration is of course
monotone in its allocation to bidder 1 and to no other bidder. Suppose after iteration j − 1, the
allocation is monotone for all bidders. In iteration j, we copy the same allocation from where sj
is lower, which by the inductive hypothesis is monotone. As we increase sj , we only modify the
allocation rule by increasing profiles where j wins the item, ensuring a monotone allocation to
bidder j during iteration j. Since we started from an allocation that was monotone to all bidders
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Figure 12: Reallocating to bidder j happens for all profiles where only si is decreased and i was
previously the winner, enforcing monotonicity in the allocation to bidder i.
after iteration j − 1, we only need to check that by performing our corrections where we reallocate
to j that we don’t interrupt monotonicity for some bidder i < j during iteration j.
Suppose that during iteration j we reallocate from bidder i to bidder j at some profile ~s. By
our allocation, either i’s value does not c-approximate j’s value, or it does not (j−1)c-approximate
the highest value. Then for any profile with only si decreased, by Lemma 1, bidder i ’s value must
also fail to c-approximate j or (j − 1)c-approximate the highest value respectively, so at all such
profiles, the item will be reallocated to j if it was previously allocated to i, as shown in Figure 12.
Thus, the allocation to bidder i is monotone.
5.4 Polytime Implementation for the Hypergrid-Coloring Mechanism
Theorem 4. The mechanism given by Hypergrid-Coloring(pi) is implementable in time O(n2k log k)
where n is the number of bidders and k is the largest size of any bidder’s signal space.
Proof. First, we illustrate that given a signal profile ~s and ordering pi, if the allocation rule x
is produced from Hypergrid-Coloring(pi), we can determine x(~s) in O(n2k) time. We prove that,
given the tentative winner of the Hypergrid-Coloring(pi) algorithm after iteration j − 1 at profile
(~s<j ,~0[j:n]), we can determine the tentative winner at (~s<j , sj ,~0[j+1:n]) after the j
th iteration in
O(nk) time. If j = 1, then after the first iteration, profile (s1,~0[2:n]) is allocated to bidder 1 in O(1)
time.
The tentative winner after iteration j at profile (~s<j , sj ,~0[j+1:n]) is either the same as the
tentative winner at (~s<j , 0,~0[j+1:n]) after iteration (j − 1), who we call bidder i, or the item is
reallocated to j. By monotonicity and the definition of Hypergrid-Coloring(pi), if the winner is j, it
is because for some smallest signal s′j ≤ sj , at profile (~s<j , s′j ,~0[j+1:n]), bidder i’s value was either
not a (j−1)c-approximation to the highest of the first j−1 values, or it was not a c-approximation to
j’s value. To determine whether i or j is the winner at (~s<j , sj ,~0[j+1:n]) after iteration j, we at most
need to check each of the k possible signals s′j ≤ sj to determine whether the item gets reallocated.
This requires determining the highest value of any of the first j bidders at each such profile, which
takes O(n) time, thus requiring O(nk) time total to compute the winner after iteration j. Then
computing the winner at profile ~s after all n iterations takes at most O(n2k) time by checking the
winner after iteration j at profile (~s≤j ,~0[j+1:n]) for all j = 1, . . . , n.
By Proposition 2, the payment of the winner at profile ~s, say bidder i, is his value vi(b
∗
i , ~s−i) at
his critical signal b∗i . In order to determine i’s critical signal, we can binary search over s
′
i < si to
find the largest s′i where x(s
′
i, ~s−i) 6= i. As there are at most k signals to binary search over, this
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gives a factor of log k times the running time of determining the winner at each such profile, which
we have already shown is O(n2k). Then determining the allocation and the payment rules runs in
time O(n2k log k).
5.5 Tight instance for Hypergrid-Coloring
We give an example of valuations that satisfy c-single-crossing, and an ordering pi for which
Hypergrid-Coloring(pi) produces an allocation that gives a tight prior-free (n−1)c-approximation to
social welfare. Consider the following valuations:
∀i 6= 2 vi(~s) =
{
0 si = 0
1 si = 1
and v2(~s) = c · |{i 6= 2 | si = 1}|.
These clearly satisfy c-single-crossing: when a bidder other than 2’s signal increases, his value
increases by 1, and bidder 2’s signal increases by exactly c. No other changes occur.
Consider the allocation x produced by Hypergrid-Coloring(pi) where pi = (1, 2, · · · , n). In the first
iteration, x(s1,~0) = 1 for all s1. Then, in iteration 2, at all profiles ~s = (s1, s2,~0), cv1(~s) = v2(~s),
so at no such profile will the algorithm reallocate to bidder 2, as his value is c-approximated. In all
iterations j > 2, we only reallocate to bidder j, thus we never allocate to bidder 2. Then at profile
~1, we must allocate to a bidder i 6= 2 with vi(~1) = 1, while v2(~1) = (n− 1)c. This instance gives a
lower bound of (n− 1)c for the algorithm, illustrating that our analysis is tight.
6 Random 2c-Approximation for Concave c-SC Valuations
In Section 5.5 it is shown that there exists an instance and ordering pi for which Hypergrid-Coloring(pi)
is a tight (n− 1)c-approximation to welfare.
In this section we consider the following randomized variant:
Random-Hypergrid-Coloring: Choose a permutation pi of the n bidders uniformly at random. Run
Hypergrid-Coloring(pi).
We show (Theorem 6) that for concave and c-single-crossing valuations, this mechanism gives a
2c-approximation. We also show that, without concavity, the same randomized mechanism gives an
(inferior) 2c3/2
√
n-approximation (see Theorem 5, whose proof appears in Appendix C). Nonethe-
less, note that Random-Hypergrid-Coloring gives an asymptotic improvement in the approximation
over the deterministic Hypergrid-Coloring(pi). Moreover, we show that the
√
n factor is unavoidable
for Random-Hypergrid-Coloring if valuations are not concave.
In this Section and in Section C we do not assume that pi is the identity permutation. Of course,
internally to Hypergrid-Coloring(pi), such a translation can be done.
Theorem 5. For arbitrary c-single-crossing valuations, Random-Hypergrid-Coloring is a universally
truthful and prior-free mechanism that gives a 2c3/2
√
n-approximation to social welfare.
Theorem 6. For concave valuations that are also c-single-crossing, Random-Hypergrid-Coloring is
a universally truthful and prior-free mechanism that gives a 2c-approximation to social welfare.
Rather than proving Theorem 6, we give a more general result from which Theorem 6 follows
as a special case. In particular, we consider a parameterized version of concave valuations, d-
concave valuations, for which the special case of d = 1 reduces to the standard definition of concave
valuations.
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Theorem 7 below shows a c(d + 1)-approximation guarantee for d-concave valuations. Before
giving the proof of Theorem 7, we give some intuition.
Recall Definition 5 of the ith intermediate profile ~sipi; this is a function of a signal profile s and
a permutation pi.
Fix a signal profile ~s, let vi∗(~s) = max` v`(~s), and let t be i
∗’s position in the randomly drawn
ordering pi (i.e., pit = i
∗; see Figure 13). Recall that if the tentative winner at ~stpi, determined in
the tth iteration, is not i∗ then it must c-approximate i∗’s value at ~stpi. Alternatively, the item is
reallocated to i∗. Therefore, the expected value of the tentative winner at ~stpi is at least 1/c of the
expected value of i∗ at ~stpi. It now follows from Lemma 4 that this also holds for the expected value
of the final winner at ~s. Therefore, it only remains to show that Epi
[
vi∗(
~stpi)
]
≥ vi∗(~s)/2.
We say that the signal of bidder i “turns on” when it changes from 0 to si, and “turns off”
when it changes from si to 0. Consider some permutation pi where the position of i
∗ is t. Let
A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be the set of bidders preceding i∗ in pi, and let B = {1, . . . , n} \ (A ∪ i∗) be the set
of bidders succeeding i∗. If the value of i∗ after the signals from bidders in A and i∗ have turned
on is vi∗(
~stpi) = α · vi∗(~s) for some 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, then obviously, the change in value of i∗ when we
turn on all signals of B is exactly (1− α) · vi∗(~s). Now consider a permutation pi′ that is obtained
from pi by switching between the bidders in B and the bidders in A. That is, in pi′, the bidders in
B precede i∗ and the bidders in A succeed i∗. Let t′ be the position of bidder i∗ in pi′ (see Figure
13 for an illustration).
Figure 13: An illustration of the permutations pi and pi′.
We now argue that
vi∗(
~
st
′
pi′) ≥ (1− α) · vi∗(~s).
To see this, note that the increase in vi∗ as a result of the signals of the bidders in B turning on,
given that the signals of the bidders in A are on, is (1− α) · vi∗(~s). It follows from concavity that
the increase in vi∗ as a result of the signals of the bidders in B turning on, given that the signals of
the bidders in A are off, can only be larger. To conclude the argument, since pi and pi′ are drawn
with equal probabilities, and vi∗(
~stpi) + vi∗(
~st
′
pi′) ≥ vi∗(~s), it holds that Epi
[
vi∗(
~stpi)
]
≥ vi∗(~s)/2, as
desired.
We now state the more general Theorem and give the formal proof.
Theorem 7. For every d-concave and c-single-crossing valuations, Random-Hypergrid-Coloring is
a randomized universally truthful and prior-free mechanism that gives a c(d+ 1)-approximation to
social welfare.
Proof. Given a profile ~s, let i∗ be the highest valued bidder in ~s; i.e., i∗ ∈ argmaxivi(~s). We show
that the expected value of i∗ at the iteration where i∗ is considered in pi is at least 1d+1 of his value
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at ~s. That is, it holds that Epi
[
vi∗(
~stpi)
]
≥ vi∗ (~s)d+1 , where t is the random variable representing i∗’s
location in a random permutation pi.
Before proving this claim, we show how it implies a c(d + 1)-approximation guarantee. Let j′
be the tentative winner in i∗’s iteration under pi. By the properties of Hypergrid-Coloring(pi), j′’s
value at ~stpi c-approximates i
∗’s value, and by Lemma 3, then vj(~s) ≥ vj′( ~stpi), where j is the final
winner; i.e., j = x(~s).
Putting it all together, if Epi
[
vi∗(
~stpi)
]
≥ 1d+1vi∗(~s), then
c · Epi [vj(~s)] ≥ c · Epi
[
vj′(
~stpi)
]
≥ Epi
[
vi∗(
~stpi)
]
≥ 1
d+ 1
vi∗(~s),
as desired.
We now prove that the expected value of i∗ at ~stpi is at least 1/(1 + d) fraction of his value at ~s.
Fix an ordering pi, and let t be i∗’s position in pi. Let A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} (resp., B = {1, . . . , n}\(A∪i∗))
be the set of bidders whose location in pi is smaller than (resp., greater than) t. That is, A and B
are the sets of bidders preceding and succeeding i∗ in pi, respectively. Let 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 be the fraction
of i∗’s value recovered at ~stpi, that is
vi∗(
~stpi) = α · vi∗(~s). (3)
It follows that the increase in i∗’s value as a result of the signals in B turning on is (1−α)·vi∗(~s).
Now consider the permutation pi′ in which A’s and B’s internal ordering is the same as in pi, but
where B precedes i∗, which in turn precedes A, as shown in Figure 13. Let t′ be i∗’s position in
pi′. Since at time t′, all the signals of bidders in A have yet to turn on and are thus 0, d-concavity
implies that the change in i∗’s value as a result of turning on the signals in B in pi′ is at least 1/d
fraction of the change in pi. That is,
vi∗(
~
st
′
pi′)− vi∗(~0) ≥
1
d
·
(
vi∗(~s)− vi∗( ~stpi)
)
which by non-negativity of vi∗(~0) and by (3) implies that
vi∗(
~
st
′
pi′) ≥
1− α
d
· vi∗(~s). (4)
By a similar argument, if the change in i∗’s value after turning on the signals from A under pi
is at most α · vi∗(~s), then by d-concavity, the change in i∗’s value after turning on the signals from
A under pi′ is even smaller—at most αd · vi∗(~s):
vi∗(~s)− vi∗( ~st′pi′) ≤ d ·
(
vi∗(
~stpi)− vi∗(~0)
)
≤ αd · vi∗(~s).
Therefore, it holds that7
vi∗(
~
st
′
pi′) ≥ (1− αd) · vi∗(~s). (5)
It follows from Equations (3) and (4) that
vi∗(
~stpi) + vi∗(
~
st
′
pi′) ≥
1 + (d− 1)α
d
· vi∗(~s), (6)
7Note that the right hand side of Equation (5) might be negative, but this is fine.
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and combining Equations (3) and (5) gives
vi∗(
~stpi) + vi∗(
~
st
′
pi′) ≥ (1− (d− 1)α) · vi∗(~s). (7)
Therefore,
vi∗(
~stpi) + vi∗(
~
st
′
pi′) ≥ max
{
1 + (d− 1)α
d
, 1− (d− 1)α
}
· vi∗(~s). (8)
The last expression obtains its minimum when the two terms in the max expression are equal,
which occurs at α = 1d+1 . Plugging this value of α into Equation (8) implies that for every pair of
pi and its corresponding pi′ (note that this is a bijection) it follows that
vi∗(
~stpi) + vi∗(
~
st
′
pi′) ≥
2
d+ 1
· vi∗(~s).
Since there are n!/2 such pairs (half the number of permutations), we can write∑
pi
vi∗(
~stpi) ≥
n!
2
· 2
d+ 1
· vi∗(~s) = n!
d+ 1
· vi∗(~s).
We conclude that
Epi
[
vi∗(
~stpi)
]
=
∑
pi
Pr[pi] · vi∗( ~stpi)
=
1
n!
·
∑
pi
vi∗(
~stpi)
≥ 1
n!
· n!
d+ 1
· vi∗(~s)
=
1
d+ 1
· vi∗(~s),
as desired.
7 Revenue Approximation
7.1 Black-box reduction for deterministic mechanisms
In this section, we give a black box mechanism that, when given a deterministic truthful allo-
cation rule x that gives an α-approximation to welfare for some α ≥ 1, earns expected revenue
1
α2+4α+1
Opt. The mechanism is very similar to that of Chawla et al. [2014]. While Chawla et al.
[2014] build upon the generalized VCG mechanism, we apply similar ideas to an arbitrary de-
terministic monotone allocation x. We later show how to extend this to a family of randomized
mechanisms, including the mechanism Random-Hypergrid-Coloring given in Section 6. As in Chawla
et al. [2014], to approximate revenue we require concave valuations (see Definition 4).
Let x(·) be a truthful allocation rule is defined for any number of bidders. Consider n bidders,
with signals si, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and let vi(~s) be the valuation of bidder i on the signal profile (s1, . . . , sn).
Let S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be a subset of the n bidders, and let ~sS denote set of signals of bidders in
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S, while ~s−S denotes the set of signals of the other bidders. For i ∈ S define the valuation
vSi (~sS) = vi(~sS , ~s−S). Fix the set of signals sS , define xS(~sS) = x(~sS , ~s−S). If x(·) is a truthful
allocation rule with approximation α with respect to some set of valuations vi(~s) then x
S(·) is a
truthful allocation rule with approximation α with respect to valuations vSi (~sS).
Definition 6. Bidder i’s winning conditional monopoly reserve price p∗i : p
∗
i (~s−i, x) is a function of
the other bidder’s signals, ~s−i, and the allocation rule x(·). Fix all other bidder signals ~s−i, and let
b∗i = minbi xi(~s−i, bi) = 1 be the critical signal for bidder i. Now, p
∗
i is the monopoly selling price
given that si ≥ b∗i and s−i. Let Ri be the expected revenue from offering the item to i at price p∗i .
Definition 7. Bidder i’s losing conditional monopoly reserve price p∗i : p
∗
i (~s−i, x) is a function of
all of the other bidder’s signals ~s−i and the allocation rule x(·). Fix all other bidder signals ~s−i,
and, as above, let b∗i = be the critical signal for bidder i. Now, p
∗
i is the monopoly selling price
given s−i and that si < b∗i . Let R˜i be the expected revenue from offering the item to i at this price.
Given a deterministic allocation function x with welfare approximation guarantee α, consider
the following [randomized] blackbox mechanism M :
(a) With probability α
2+1
α2+4αd+1
: Given signals ~s, let i := x(~s) be the winner of the original
allocation at ~s. Offer bidder i the item at price p∗i (~s−i, x(·)). Note that the item need not be
sold.
(b) With probability 4αd
α2+4αd+1
: Let Z ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be chosen uniformly at random from all such
subsets. Let i := xZ(~sZ) be the winner of the allocation restricted to potential winners from
Z. Give the item to i if her value at the reported signals is above his conditional monopoly
reserve price p∗i (~s−i, x(·;Z)).
Theorem 8. Mechanism M earns a (α2 + 4αd+ 1)-approximation to the optimal revenue.
Proof. Rename the bidders such that 1 = x(~s; [n]) is the winner among all n bidders, 2 ∈ argmaxi 6=1vi(~s)
is a bidder with the highest value aside from 1, and 3 = x(~s;Z) is the winner among the random
set of potential winners Z.
Fix a set of signals ~s. First we observe that when the mechanism executes (a), the expected
revenue is exactly R1, as the mechanism offers the winning conditional monopoly reserve price to
1. When the mechanism executes (b) and the winner is bidder 3, the expected revenue is at least
R˜3 for any random set of bidders Z. This is because, conditioning that 3’s signal is more than the
critical signal b∗3(s−i, x(·;Z)) can only increase the revenue when he is the winner at x(·; [n]) (in
which case, without conditioning the expected revenue is at least R3 > R˜3) or not (in which case,
without conditioning the the expected revenue is at least R˜3). Notice that the events that we run
(b), 1 /∈ Z and 2 ∈ Z are independent. Let A be the event that 1 6∈ Z and 2 ∈ Z. We therefore
bound the revenue of the mechanism by
Rev(M) ≥ Pr[(a)]E~s[R1] + Pr[(b) ∩A]E~s,Z [R˜3 | A]
=
1
α2 + 4αd+ 1
(
(α2 + 1) · E~s[R1] + αd · E~s,Z [R˜3 | A]
)
.
In addition, for any mechanism, an upper bound on the revenue is the lookahead benchmark. In
our setting, this is the revenue from selling only to the winner at his winning conditional monopoly
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reserve, plus the welfare of the highest valued agent who did not win (Lemma 4.1 in Chawla et al.
[2014]). That is,
Lookahead Benchmark: Opt ≤ E~s[R1 + v2(~s)]. (9)
Since we will bound the value of bidder 2 by the value of bidder 3, we now observe that the value
of bidder 3 is bounded by the revenue from offering conditional monopoly reserves to bidders 1 or
3.
E~s,Z [v3(~s) | A] = E~s,Z [v3(s1, ~s−1) − v3(b∗1, ~s−1) + v3(b∗1, ~s−1) | A]
≤ E~s,Z
[
d
(
v3(s1, 0[3], ~s−13)− v3(b∗1, 0[3], ~s−13)
)
+ v3(b
∗
1, ~s−1)
∣∣∣ A] d-concavity
≤ E~s,Z [dv3(s1, 0[3], ~s−13) + v3(b∗1, ~s−1) | A] Nonnegativity of v3
≤ E~s,Z [dR˜3 + v3(b∗1, ~s−1) | A] Definition 7 of R˜3
≤ d · E~s,Z [R˜3 | A] + E~s[αv1(b∗1, ~s−1)] x α-approximates welfare
≤ d · E~s,Z [dR˜3 | A] + αE~s[R1]. Definition 6 of R1
(10)
Lines 4 and 6 hold because the winning conditional monopoly reserve price for 1 is at least v1(b
∗
1, ~s−1)
and the losing conditional monopoly reserve price for 3 is at least v3(s3 = 0, ~s−3), and in both cases,
the buyer has value above this with probability 1. Line 5 holds since 1 wins at (b∗1, ~s−1) by definition
of b∗1 and an the winner in x α-approximates any other bidder.
Opt ≤ E~s[R1 + v2(~s)] Lookahead Benchmark (9)
≤ E~s[R1] + E~s,Z [α v3(~s) | A] 3 = x(~s;Z); x α-approximates welfare of Z; 2 ∈ Z
≤ (α2 + 1) · E~s[R1] + αd · E~s,Z [R˜3 | A]. E~s[R1] = E~s,Z [R1 | A] and (10)
All together, this gives
Opt ≤ (α2 + 1) · E~s[R1] + αd · E~s,Z [R˜3 | A] ≤
(
α2 + 4αd+ 1
)
Rev(M).
The above theorem, and Theorem 2 from Section 4.2 yield the following.
Corollary 2. For c-single-crossing concave valuations supported on 2 signals, there exist a mech-
anism that gives (c2 + 4c+ 1)-approximation to the optimal revenue.
7.2 Extension to randomized mechanisms
We first note that reduction from welfare to revenue does not automatically give a reduction from
expected welfare to expected revenue, as even if some random variable X ≥ 1 has some expectation
E[X] = α, the expectation of X2 might be much larger8 than α2.
8To see this, consider a random varible X that takes value 1 with probability 1 − p and αM with probability
p = α−1
αM−1 for some very large M .
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Instead, we state the following. Consider a randomized mechanism such that for every set S,
the probability that j ← xS(~sS) has a value at ~s that α-approximates the maximum valued agent
at S is at least p (independently for each S). Consider the case where both x(~s) and xZ(~sZ)
output an allocation that is α-approximation to the maximum valued bidder in {1, . . . , n} and Z
respectively (this happens with probability p2). In this case, the analysis of the previous section
follows. Therefore, conditioning on A and this event gives the desired guarantee. To optimize the
parameters, we run (a) with probability α
2+1
α2+(4αd)/p2+1
and with probability (4αd)/p
2
α2+(4αd)/p2+1
run (b).
Plugging in the analysis from previous section yields an (α2 + 4αd/p2 + 1)-approximation to the
revenue.
Inspecting Random-Hypergrid-Coloring in the case of concave valuations, we notice that, with
probability at least 1/2, the winner is a 2c-approximation to the optimal welfare. To see this,
consider a set of signals ~s where i∗ ∈ argmaxi∈{1,...,n}vi(~s). Consider an ordering pi in which some
set A precedes i∗, and some set B = {1, . . . , n} \ {A ∪ i∗} succeeds i∗ and the ordering pi′ with A
and B switched: where B precedes i∗ and A succeeds i∗. As stated in Section 6, if the value of i∗
at ~si
∗
pi (that is, after all signals in A∪ i∗ are turned on) is α · vi(~s), then concavity ensures that i∗’s
value at ~si
∗
pi′ is at least (1 − α) · vi(~s). Therefore, at least in one of the orderings pi and pi′, in i∗’s
iteration, i∗’s value is at least half of its value at ~s. By the way Random-Hypergrid-Coloring works,
the tentative winner after this iteration must c-approximate i∗’s value, and thus 2c-approximation
to his value at ~s. Since permutation pi and pi′ are drawn with the same probability, this gives the
desired guarantee.
Corollary 3. For c-single-crossing concave valuations supported on an arbitrary number of signals,
there exist a mechanism that gives (4c2 + 32c+ 1)-approximation to the optimal revenue.
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A Alternative Single Crossing Definitions
We have defined our notion of c single crossing as a relaxation of the single crossing definition in
[Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016]. This definition imply additional definitions that have been
used in the literature [Milgrom and Weber, 1982; d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet, 1982; Maskin,
1992; Ausubel et al., 1999; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000; Bergemann et al., 2009; Chawla et al.,
2014; Che et al., 2015; Li, 2016]. Thus, the impossibility results given in Sections 2 and 3 hold for
any of these definitions.
It is less clear how to define a c-single crossing relaxation for other variants of the single crossing
definition. The definition of single crossing in [Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016] is closed
under subsets: if a set of valuation functions have this property then so does every subset. In
contrast, the [Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000] definition is that for all i 6= j,
∂vi
∂si
(~s) ≥ ∂vj
∂si
(~s) (11)
at any point where vi(~s) = vj(~s) = maxk vk(~s). This definition is not closed under subsets.
However, if we modify the definition so that Equation (11) holds whenever vi(~s) = vj(~s), the
modified definition is closed under subsets. Now, one could define a new version of c-single crossing
based upon the above: for all i 6= j,
∂vi
∂si
(~s) ≥ 1
c
· ∂vj
∂si
(~s)
at any point where vi(~s) = vj(~s). The proofs for 2 bidders, 2 signals, and the randomized approx-
imations, when applied to this new definition, give the same results as the ones obtained in this
paper.
B Exact Numbers Satisfying the Structure in Figure 7
We now present exact numbers that support the structure suggested in Figure 7 in Section 4.4. In
this example, c = 2. One can verify that in ~sa = (2, 0, 0) no bidder c-approximates bidder 2’s value,
in ~sc = (1, 1, 0) bidder 2’s value does not c-approximate bidder 3’s value, and in ~se = (0, 1, 1) no
bidder c-approximates bidder 1’a value, as desired in order to yield the contradiction.
(0, 1, 0) ~sc = (1, 1, 0) (2, 1, 0)
v1 = 0.007219 v1 = 0.014529 v1 = 0.017809
v2 = 0.004286 v2 = 0.008091 v2 = 0.014651
v3 = 0.003180 v3 = 0.017799 v3 = 0.017809
(0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) ~sa = (2, 0, 0)
v1 = 0 v1 = 0.000100 v1 = 0.003381
v2 = 0.000676 v2 = 0.000876 v2 = 0.007436
v3 = 0.003170 v3 = 0.003370 v3 = 0.003380
~se = (0, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1) (2, 1, 1)
v1 = 0.009449 v1 = 0.016760 v1 = 0.020040
v2 = 0.004295 v2 = 0.008101 v2 = 0.014661
v3 = 0.004295 v3 = 0.018915 v3 = 0.018925
(0, 0, 1) (1, 0, 1) (2, 0, 1)
v1 = 0.002231 v1 = 0.002331 v1 = 0.005611
v2 = 0.000686 v2 = 0.000886 v2 = 0.007446
v3 = 0.004286 v3 = 0.004486 v3 = 0.004495
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C Random Mechanisms for General c-SC Valuations
In this section we show that if the permutation pi is chosen randomly, then the approximation
guarantee given for Random-Hypergrid-Coloring improves significantly. In Section C.1 we establish
a 2c3/2
√
n-approximation guarantee, and in Section C.2 we show that the
√
n factor is inevitable
(for this mechanism).
C.1 A Random, Prior-Free, Universally Truthful 2c3/2
√
n-Approximation
Given a signal profile ~s, a permutation pi, let
~
sjpi be the jth intermediate profile as defined in
Definition 5.
We define xjpi(~s) to be the tentative winner for
~
sjpi set during the jth iteration of Hypergrid-Coloring(pi).
To simplify the notation hereinafter, we drop ~s from xtpi. In Lemmas 3, 4, we rename the t
th
bidder in the ordering pi to t, and omit pi as well. Therefore, we use ~st, and xt.
Theorem 5. For arbitrary c-single-crossing valuations, Random-Hypergrid-Coloring is a universally
truthful and prior-free mechanism that gives a 2c3/2
√
n-approximation to social welfare.
The high level idea of our proof is as follows. Fix a permutation pi. For any bid profile ~s where
agent i∗ ∈ argmaxi{vi(~s)} has the highest value, we show that if Hypergrid-Coloring(pi) performs
badly, then if i∗ is placed sufficiently close to the end of the ordering, the allocated bidder is
guaranteed to be a good approximation of i∗. The reason for this is the following: let j be the
allocated bidder under permutation pi, and assume by renaming that agent i is the ith agent in the
ordering. Consider the bid profile ~s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn), and all the intermediate bid profiles that
Hypergrid-Coloring(pi) considers, ~si = (s1, s2, . . . , si,~0[i+1:n]) for every i (the bid profile where the
last i+ 1, . . . , n signals are zeroed). If for any i, the value of i∗ increases by a lot from profile ~si−1
to ~si, then by c-single-crossing, i’s value must also increase. However, i’s increase cannot be much
larger than the value of j at ~s; otherwise, Hypergrid-Coloring(pi) would have allocated to i at ~si,
and then j would not win at ~s. Therefore, there is no i where vi∗(
~si)− vi∗( ~si−1) is too large (this
is cast in Lemma 4).
Because the increase of i∗’s value cannot be too large between intermediate profiles, if i∗ was
to appear toward the end of pi, his value at the intermediate profile must already be a sufficiently
large fraction of his value at ~s, and thus any allocated bidder must have also been a good enough
approximation to i∗; otherwise, Hypergrid-Coloring(pi) would have reallocated to i∗. Since pi is
chosen uniformly at random, the probability that i∗ appears towards the end of pi is sufficiently
large to guarantee a good approximation.
We use the following two lemmas to prove the improved approximation guarantee for our ran-
domized mechanism.
The first lemma shows that the value of the final winner is (weakly) greater than the value of
any tentative winner. This is proved by showing that as the iteration number t increases, the value
of the tentative winner increases.
Lemma 3. Given a profile ~s and permutation pi, and assume Hypergrid-Coloring(pi) allocates to j
at ~s. For any iteration t, vxt(
~st) ≤ vj(~s).
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Proof. Observe that Hypergrid-Coloring(pi) has the following properties: (a) whenever the algorithm
reallocates at some profile, the value of the new tentative winner is larger than the previous one,
and (b) if the algorithm does not reallocate as we increase st during iteration t, then the tentative
winner’s value (weakly) increases.
We prove the lemma by backwards induction on t. When t = n, xt = j and
~st = ~s, so the claim
is a tautology. Suppose that for t ≤ n, vxt(~st) ≤ vj(~s). To finish the proof, one needs to show that
vxt−1(
~st−1) ≤ vxt(~st). (12)
At iteration t, one of the following must happen:
• Either the tentative winner stayed the same, i.e., xt−1 = xt, and (12) holds by (b), or
• We reallocate to t at some ~s′ = (s1, . . . , st−1, s′t, 0[t+1:n]) for s′t ≤ st. By (b), we have that
vxt−1(
~st−1) ≤ vxt−1(~s′), by (a) vxt−1(~s′) ≤ vxt(~s′), and by (b) vxt(~s′) ≤ vxt(~st). Chaining the
last three inequalities yields (12).
Hence, (12) holds, and the lemma follows.
The second lemma formalizes the intuition that at every iteration of Hypergrid-Coloring, i∗’s
increase in value cannot be large compared to the winners’ value.
Lemma 4 (Change Bounded by The Allocated Value). Suppose the final allocation at ~s is to agent
j and the highest value at ~s is of agent i∗ ∈ argmaxivi(~s). Then for every iteration t,
vi∗(
~st)− vi∗( ~st−1) ≤ c2vj(~s).
Proof. First, notice that by the definition of c-single-crossing,
vi∗(
~st)− vi∗( ~st−1) ≤ c
(
vt(
~st)− vt( ~st−1)
)
. (13)
To finish the proof, we argue that
vt(
~st) ≤ cvj(~s). (14)
By the non-negativity of vt, combining (13) with (14) is enough to to prove the lemma. Recall that
by renaming, agent i is at position i in the ordering pi. To show (14), we consider two cases.
Case 1: If t > j, then to wind up with x(~s) = j, after iteration t, we must have had xt = j.
Thus, it must be the case that vt(
~st) ≤ cvj(~st), or Hypergrid-Coloring would have reallocated to
bidder t during iteration t. By monotonicity, vj(
~st) ≤ vj(~s), so (14) follows.
Case 2 : If t ≤ j, then if j′ = xt is the tentative winner after iteration t, it must be the case
that either j′ = t, or vt(~st) ≤ c · vj′(~st). Otherwise, Hypergrid-Coloring would have reallocated to
bidder t at that iteration. Since by Lemma 3, vj′(
~st) ≤ vj(~s), (14) follows in this case as well.
We conclude that in both cases, (14) follows, and hence, so does the lemma.
We now proceed to prove the theorem.
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Proof of Theorem 5. (Monotonicity.) Random-Hypergrid-Coloring is clearly universally truthful: the
only random choices of the algorithm are in selecting an ordering pi uniformly at random, which is
done independent of the bid profile ~s. Given pi, the algorithm returns the allocation rule x from
Hypergrid-Coloring(pi), which we have already proven is monotone.
(Approximation.) For any given signal profile ~s, let i∗ ∈ argmaxivi(~s) be the bidder with the
highest value at ~s. Observe that we can draw the permutation pi used in Random-Hypergrid-Coloring
in the following manner. First, we draw the relative positioning of every bidder except i∗ (using
a uniformly at random permutation), denoted by pi−i∗ . Rename the bidders such that pi−i∗ =
(1, . . . , n− 1). Then, draw the position of i∗ by drawing a uniform number in t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, giving
pi = (1, . . . , t− 1, i∗, t, . . . , n− 1). This permutation is drawn uniformly at random, thus satisfying
the requirements of Random-Hypergrid-Coloring.
We show that for every pi−i∗ , i∗’s value at ~s is well-approximated a large fraction of the iterations.
For the remainder of the proof, let pi−i∗ be fixed, so the choice of t defines pi.
For all such orderings with pi−i∗ fixed, let pi′ be the ordering where i∗ is in the worst position
with respect to how i∗’s value at ~s is approximated. That is, let t′ be the position of i∗, where
pi′ = (1, . . . , t′−1, i∗, t′, . . . , n−1). Let j′ be the bidder who is allocated at ~s in Hypergrid-Coloring(pi′);
j′’s value is minimum over all potential winners j in Hypergrid-Coloring(pi) with pi−i∗ fixed. Let αcn
be the approximation of j′’s value to i∗ where α < 1, that is,
vi∗(~s) = αcn · vj′(~s). (15)
Consider the iteration z = n− αn2c under pi′. We have that
vi∗( ~s
z
pi′) = vi∗(~s)−
n∑
`=z+1
(
vi∗(
~s`pi′)− vi∗( ~s`−1pi′ )
)
≥ vi∗(~s)−
n∑
`=n−αn
2c
+1
c2vj′(~s) by Lemma 4
= vi∗(~s)− 1
2
αcn · vj′(~s)
=
vi∗(~s)
2
. by (15) (16)
Note that, coordinate-wise, it holds that
~szpi′ ≤ (~s[1:z],~0[z+1:n−1], si∗).
To see this, note that if t′ > z, then ~szpi′ = (~s[1:z],~0[z+1:n−1], 0), and if t
′ ≤ z, then ~szpi′ =
(~s[1:z−1],~0[z:n−1], si∗).
Let
~stpi = (~s[1:t−1],~0[t:n−1], si∗)
be the ordering in which i∗ is in position t (fixing pi−i∗).
By definition of Hypergrid-Coloring(pi), if the tentative winner at profile ~stpi after iteration t is j˜,
then
vj˜(
~stpi) ≥ vi∗( ~stpi)/c, (17)
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as otherwise the algorithm would have reallocated to i∗.
In addition, in the event where i∗ is among the last αn2c bidders (i.e., t > z), by monotonicity of
vi∗ and by (16),
vi∗(
~stpi) ≥ vi∗( ~szpi′) ≥
vi∗(~s)
2
. (18)
Let j be the allocated bidder at ~s in Hypergrid-Coloring(pi), then
Et[vj(~s)] ≥ Et[vj˜( ~stpi)] by Lemma 3
≥ Et[vi∗( ~stpi)/c] by (17)
≥ 1
c
Et[vi∗( ~stpi)|t > z] · Prt[t > z]
≥ 1
c
· vi∗(~s)
2
· αn
2cn
by (18) and the random choice of t
=
vi∗(~s)
4c2
α
. (19)
Therefore, the approximation ratio is at most 4c
2
α . However, since at the worst position of i
∗, the
approximation ratio is αcn, then at a random position, the approximation ratio is at most αcn.
Therefore, in expectation, we get a min{4c2/α, αcn}-approximation to i∗’s value at ~s. This is
maximized, i.e., gets the worst possible ratio, when α =
√
4c/n, giving a 2c3/2
√
n-approximation.
Since this holds for every possible pi−i∗ that is drawn, then overall we have a 2c3/2
√
n-approximation.
C.2 Lower Bound of Ω(c
√
n/ log n) for Random-Hypergrid-Coloring
We now show a lower bound of Ω(c
√
n/ log n) for Random-Hypergrid-Coloring.
Consider the following example. There are n + 1 agents—n of them are partitioned into
√
n
logn
fixed sets S of size log n
√
n, plus some lonesome i∗. Each bidder has a low (0) and high (1) signal.
The valuation functions are as follows. For agent i ∈ S, vi(~s) = 1[sj = 1∀j ∈ S], that is, his
value is 1 if and only if every agent in his set has a high signal, and is otherwise 0. Agent i∗ has
a value that is c times the number of sets where all agents are high, that is, v∗i (~s) = c · |{S : sj =
1∀j ∈ S}|.
Clearly it also satisfies c-single-crossing: as any bidder i 6= i∗ changes his signal from low to
high, if his value changes, it does by 1. So do the values of everyone else in his set, so they’re
clearly single-crossing. So does i∗’s value by c, which is clearly c-single-crossing. If his value does
not change, then he does not make an entire set high, nor does he increase the number of sets that
are high, so no one’s value changes, which is also c-single-crossing. None of the agents have signals
that depend on i∗, so his value is trivially c-single-crossing.
For any set S, the probability over the random ordering that none of its agents appear in the
last
√
n in the permutation is( n−√n
logn
√
n
)(
n
logn
√
n
) ≤ (n−√n
n
)logn√n
=
(
1− 1√
n
)logn√n
≤ e− logn = 1
n
.
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Then, over all
√
n
logn sets, the probability that any of the sets have no agents appear in the end
is, by a union bound, at most
√
n
logn · 1n . That is, with probability at least 1 − 1√n logn , none of the
sets have no agents appear at the end, or equivalently, every set has some agent who comes in the
last
√
n of the permutation, and thus at any cell allocated in the first n −√n iterations, i∗ has a
valuation of 0.
Then if this event occurs and i∗ comes in the first n−√n in the permutation, i∗ has a valuation
of 0, so we will not allocate to i∗, and thus at the end, in cell ~1, we must have allocated to a bidder
i 6= i∗ who has value 1, making our approximation off by a factor of c|S| = c
√
n
logn .
That is, with probability at least n−
√
n
n ·
(
1− 1√
n logn
)
our approximation is off by c
√
n
logn . We
can lower bound this probability by 1− 2√
n
.
Then at best, our approximation is(
1− 2√
n
)
log n
c
√
n
+
2√
n
=
(
√
n− 2) log n+√n2c
cn
≤
√
n log n+
√
n2c
cn
=
log n+ 2c
c
√
n
.
For c < log n, this gives a lower bound of at least
√
nc/ log n.
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